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I. INTRODUCTION
Events at American Airlines in February 1997 demonstrate the
power of status quo provisions in the Railway Labor Act of 19261
(RLA). Four minutes after the Allied Pilots Union went on strike,
President Clinton initiated a Presidential Emergency Board, triggering
a sixty-day cooling-off period, and the strike was over.2
Regardless of the merits of American Airlines' union's or
management's claims in the controversy, a strike would have been
disruptive and harmful to the national economy.3  As a separate
example, during the four-day American Airlines Flight Attendant
strike in November 1993, thousands of Thanksgiving holiday travelers
were stranded, and cities dependent on American's business, such as
Miami, suffered substantial economic loss.4
t 315 U.S. 386 (1942).
* B.S. 1978, United States Air Force Academy; J.D. 1997, Seattle University School of Law;
American Airlines pilot, 1985 through present. The author wishes to acknowledge the inspiration
and devotion of both his wife Patricia Schuler and his father Jack Schuler, the "wind beneath his
wings."
1. The Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1994)).
2. See James Bennet, American Airlines Pilots Strike But Clinton Orders Them Back, N.Y.
TIMES, February 15, 1997, at 1; Donna Rosato, Pilots OK Contract with American, USA TODAY,
May 6, 1997, at B1.
3. See Adam Bryant, A Showdown Forced by the Power of a Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1997, at 1.
4. See Laura Castenada et al., Customers Watch Planes Leave Empty, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 19, 1993, at 1 (at Miami International, American Airlines accounts for forty percent
of all passengers); Dirk Johnson, American Airlines' Pilots Decide To Fly Empty Jets to Back Strike,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at 1 (the flight attendant strike crippled travel throughout the
nation); Edwin McDowell, Air Travelers May Face a Void as Thanksgiving Nears Without
American, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at 6 (American Airlines accounts for almost twenty
percent of domestic air travel).
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The avoidance of labor strife and the resulting harmful effects on
the national economy are precisely the reason Congress implemented
the status quo provisions of the RLA.' During the running of any
status quo restriction as shown by the cooling-off period example
above, labor is not allowed to strike, and management is not allowed
to significantly change working conditions.6 These restrictions are
designed to divert both labor and management from counterproductive
activities and refocus their attention back toward constructive
bargaining efforts.7
To facilitate the RLA dispute resolution process, Congress
designed the RLA status quo provisions to be equally available to both
labor and management.' However, after the Williams Court misinter-
preted the Congressional intent behind a 1934 RLA amendment, new
labor unions have been routinely denied RLA status quo protections
during critical portions of the negotiation process.9 As used in this
Comment, new unions are those which the National Mediation Board
(NMB) has certified to represent an employee group, but which have
not yet negotiated the first labor contract with an employer. As a
result of the Williams ruling, new unions have no RLA status quo
remedy to counteract unilateral, employer-instituted changes in
working conditions while the first contract is under negotiation.1 °
The Court's restrictive interpretation of the RLA continues to
cause unnecessary labor strife between unions and management,
thereby frustrating the intent of Congress. While negotiations are
ongoing concerning the first labor contract between a union and an
employer, the imbalance in RLA status quo application can only lead
to more labor strife. This strife ultimately will lead to interruption and
inconvenience in the transportation industry during a protracted labor
strike." The labor unrest resulting from the negotiating imbalance
is exactly what Congress sought to avoid when legislating the RLA.
5. The Railway Labor Act of 1926, amended by Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat.
1185, 1186 (1934) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1994)) (reasons set out in preamble of
this section).
6. See generally Railway Labor Act of 1926, §§ 2, 5, 6, and 10 (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 152, 155, 156, 160 (1994)).
7. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150
(1969) (showing how the status quo requirements are central to the RLA's design.).
8. See id.
9. Williams, 315 U.S. at 402-03.
10. See id.
11. See Adam Bryant, End to Strike Is Only a Lull in Industrywide Upheaval, Airline Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at C23.
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Consequently, this Comment argues that Williams either should
be overruled, or should be appropriately limited to the fact-specific
setting under which it was decided.
To develop this thesis, Part II of this Comment will discuss both
the history of labor unrest which drove Congress to pass the RLA and
the design features of the RLA legislation which facilitate an atmo-
sphere of cooperative bargaining through which the RLA dispute
resolution system operates. Part III will discuss the first impression
Williams case, wherein the Supreme Court gave an overly restrictive
interpretation to the RLA, and will also discuss the post-Williams
treatment of new unions under the RLA. Part IV will discuss a recent
Second Circuit case, Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Atlantic
Coast Airlines, Inc.,12 in order to illustrate how continued adherence
to Williams' restrictive interpretation of the RLA defeats the intent of
Congress. Part V will present proposals to rectify the unfortunate
implications for labor peace resulting from the Williams Court's
misinterpretation of the RLA. The Comment concludes by reinforcing
the fact that the RLA was intended to prevent labor strife, and
continued adherence to the Williams decision will only lead to
increased labor strife.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Labor Unrest
Violent labor conflicts were especially notable in the history of the
railroad industry during the late nineteenth century and continuing
through the beginning of the twentieth century. Clashes of near-
revolutionary ferver pitted workers, farmers, and even urban merchants
against the railroads' monopolistic power. 3 For example, during the
"Great Upheaval of 1877" the townspeople of Pittsburgh set fire to a
roundhouse and destroyed 104 locomotives, 2,152 cars, and 79
buildings."
The Debs' Rebellion is another example of violent railroad labor
unrest. 5 The incident began with railroad union workers boycotting
Pullman cars. Railroad management countered the union boycott by
loading United States mail onto Pullman cars and then by charging the
striking workers with illegal interference with the mail. The Illinois
12. 55 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 1995).
13. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR
ORGANIZATION 12 (Robert F. Koretz ed., 1970).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 3.
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governor responded by activating the state militia. The conflict
escalated into violence, reaching its peak on July 7, 1894, when soldiers
opened fire on a crowd and killed 30 people. 6
World War I forced government intervention to quell this kind
of railroad labor unrest which continued into the beginning of the
twentieth century. 7 During the war, the railroad industry continued
to experience labor shortages and unrest.' The government response
to the wartime transportation crisis was to seize operational control
over the railroads.' 9 However, the transportation crisis during World
War I also caused the government to recognize that the transportation
industry was vital to national security. This recognition ultimately
resulted in the first significant changes to labor legislation. 20
The legislative changes were implemented after World War I
ended and during the period when Congress transferred the railroads
back into private hands.2  As part of the transfer process, an unprec-
edented series of conferences between railway executives and union
officials resulted in a new cooperative approach to dispute resolution
specifically tailored for railway labor legislation.22 Based on input
from these conferences, a bill was drafted and submitted to Congress.
It was subsequently passed without significant changes by both houses
on May 20, 1926, and became known as the Railway Labor Act of
1926.23 Key to the success of the new RLA approach were status quo
provisions promoting stability within the transportation industry.
16. See id. at 3.
17. See id. at 14.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 15.
21. See id. at 14.
22. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 148-49 ("To this end, the Act
established rather elaborate machinery for negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and
conciliation."); see also Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
563-64 (1930); SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 15.
23. SCHWARTZ supra note 13, at 15; Texas & N.O. Ry., 281 U.S. at 563-64. In addition,
Congress incorporated the airline industry into the RLA in a 1936 amendment. See Railway
Labor Act of 1926, amended by Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189 (current version at
45 U.S.C. § 180 (1994)).
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B. How the Status Quo Provisions Facilitate an Atmosphere of
Cooperative Bargaining Through the RLA Dispute Resolution System
As an overview, the status quo provisions provide that collective
bargaining agreements never expire, but are only amended as the need
arises.24 They also mandate that the status quo be maintained for an
almost unlimited amount of time during subsequent contract negotia-
tions.25 Further, the provisions facilitate bargaining by restricting
both parties from resorting to counter-productive measures during
negotiations.2 6
The status quo provisions are not easily discernible, however,
because they are scattered among RLA sections 5, 6, and 10.27 In
addition, they are not easy to follow because the numbering of the
sections does not necessarily reflect the order in which the sections are
applied. 28  The best way to demonstrate how the RLA status quo
provisions fit together is to walk through the normal flow of a dispute
resolved under the RLA dispute resolution process.
Initially, the NMB certifies a union for which a recognized
employee group has voted. 29  After the union is formed, the union
and the company are required to meet with each other and negotiate
in good faith to form an initial collective bargaining agreement.3 0
Once in place, the initial collective bargaining agreement formed under
the RLA never expires, thus providing stability. 3
All modifications to the permanent collective bargaining agreement
are then negotiated under two separate processes depending upon
whether a problem area is classified as a minor or major dispute.3 2
24. See Seaboard World Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 443 F.2d 437 (2nd. Cir.
1971).
25. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees,
481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987).
26. See Local 808, Bldg. Maintenance Serv. & Ry. Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 888
F.2d 1428, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
27. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, §§ 5, 6, and 10 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 155,
156, 160 (1994)).
28. See id.
29. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, Third, Fourth, and Fifth (current version at 45
U.S.C. § 152, Third, Fourth, and Fifth (1994)).
30. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, Second and Ninth (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Second and Ninth (1994)); SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 17; see also Virginia Ry. v.
System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937) (stating that the RLA requires the employer to
meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints,
and to make reasonable effort to work out differences).
31. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, Seventh (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Seventh (1994)).
32. See Elegin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-25 (1945).
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Minor disputes arise out of the interpretation or application of a
collective bargaining agreement and are settled through arbitration by
the NMB 3 Because the ruling of the arbitrator is binding, arbitra-
tion alleviates the necessity to resort to status quo provisions.34
In contrast, the major dispute resolution mechanism entails a
cooperative negotiation process between labor and management and,
therefore, necessitates the use of status quo provisions to facilitate a
cooperative bargaining atmosphere. The cooperative negotiation
atmosphere is necessary for labor peace because major disputes involve
changes to significant areas of the permanent agreement such as rates
of pay, rules, and working conditions.3" To preserve cooperation,
either party desiring to modify rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions must give advance written notice of the intended changes to
the other party. This notice, labeled by the RLA section from which
it is derived, is termed a "Section 6" notice.36
The RLA major dispute process then requires representatives
from both parties to meet and bargain in good faith.37 Since the
NMB is not a party to the Section 6 negotiations, the parties are
required to maintain the status quo as a protection to the bargaining
process. Changes to the status quo are prohibited throughout the
33. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, Sixth (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth
(1994)); see also Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 143.
34. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 3(i)-(1) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 153(i)-(1)
(1994)).
35. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, Seventh (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Seventh (1994)) ("No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed
in such agreements or in Section 6 of the Act."); see also Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396
U.S. at 148 ("The problem of strikes was considered to be particularly acute in the area of 'major
disputes,' those disputes involving the formation of collective agreements and efforts to change
them.") (emphasis added).
36. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994)). Section
6 provides in relevant part:
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written
notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions .... In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or
... the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party... rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the
controversy has been finally acted upon as required by Section 5 of this Act, by the
Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of
conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.
Id.
37. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2, First (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152, First
(1994)).
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completion of all negotiations, and negotiations continue without a time
limit.38
If the parties reach an impasse, either party may further extend
the status quo by requesting federal mediation under RLA Section
5.39 Federal mediation can last several years.40 If mediation proves
unsuccessful, 4 the President of the United States may declare a
Presidential Emergency Board (PEB) under RLA Section 10, during
which time the status quo will be maintained for up to an additional
sixty days.42 As an example of the lengthy design of this process, the
American Airlines negotiation participants exchanged Section 6 notices
38. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, §§ 6, 5, First (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 155,
First (1994)).
39. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 5, First (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 155, First
(1994)). This section reads in pertinent part:
The parties, or either party, to a dispute between an employee or group of employees
and a carrier may invoke the services of the Mediation Board in any of the following...
: (a) A dispute concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions not
adjusted by the parties in conference.... The Mediation Board may proffer its services
in case any labor emergency is found by it to exist at any time.
Id.
40. See Local 808, Bldg. Maintenance Serv. & Ry. Workers, 888 F.2d at 1438 (stating that
the NMB's power to postpone the party's release from mediation constitutes a tool for compelling
a carrier to engage in reasonable efforts to reach an agreement); see also International Ass'n of
Machinists v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding that the
NMB's power to deny release from mediation for years at a time is virtually immune from judicial
review).
41. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 5, First (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 155, First
(1994)). This section reads as follows:
If mediation is unsuccessful and arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused
by one or both parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its
mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in the intervening
period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency board shall be created under
Section 10 of this Act, no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose.
Id.
42. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 10 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1994)). This
section provides:
If a dispute between a carrier and its employees... in the judgment of the Mediation
Board, threaten[s] substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to
deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation
Board shall notify the President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board
to investigate and report respecting such dispute . .. . Such board shall . . . make a
report thereon to the President within thirty days from the date of its creation . ...
After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such board has made its report
to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the
controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose.
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during the summer of 1994. The status quo period continued until a
contract was ratified on May 5, 1997, almost three years later.43
The Supreme Court has stated that the status quo requirements
are "purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and
practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves
the dispute."" Maintaining the status quo during negotiating periods
is essential for labor peace, which in turn promotes national economic
interests.
The Act's status quo requirement is central to its design .
[S]ince disputes usually arise when one party wants to change the
status quo without undue delay, the power which the Act gives the
other party to preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will
frequently make it worthwhile for the moving party to compromise
with the interests of the other side and thus reach agreement
without interruption to commerce.4"
The importance of the parties' ability to invoke the status quo
provisions equally cannot be overstated. Congress' major purpose for
developing and implementing the RLA was to prevent strikes and to
enact a mechanism which would allow the nation's transportation
industry to amicably settle labor issues.46 It is interesting to note that
during the 1997 pilot strike, American Airlines management success-
fully lobbied the President to invoke RLA status quo restrictions
through implementation of a PEB.47 In contrast, during the 1993
flight attendant strike, they fought against a similar request for a PEB
by the flight attendant union.48 American Airlines management's
actions demonstrate that parties cannot have it both ways. In order for
the RLA status quo provisions to have the intended meaning and
43. Rosato, supra note 2, at B1.
44. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966);
see also Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 149 ("A final and crucial aspect of the Act
was the power given to the parties and to representatives of the public to make the exhaustion of
the Act's remedies an almost interminable process.").
45. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 150.
46. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1994)). The
purposes of the RLA, in pertinent part, are set out in the preamble of RLA Section 2: "(1) To
avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein ... [and];
(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions." Id. See also, Texan & N.O. Ry., 281 U.S. at 565 ("[T]he major purpose
of Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was 'to provide a machinery to prevent strikes."');
Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 547 ("[The RLA's] major objective is the avoidance of industrial strife,
by conference between the authorized representatives of employer and employee.").
47. See Bennet, supra note 2, at 1.
48. See Adam Bryant, American Rejects Request for Mediation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993,
at A7.
[Vol. 21:189
Labor Strife
effect, parties must have equal ability to invoke the status quo in order
to foster the proper cooperative bargaining atmosphere. Unfortunately,
as the following discussion will show, the holding in Williams v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co. seriously frustrates the process of peaceful
dispute resolution.
III. WILLIAMS' IMPACT ON RLA APPLICATION
A. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. 9
Conflicting with the Congressional intent behind the RLA, the
Williams decision stands as an obstacle to the process of peaceful
dispute resolution. By denying RLA status quo protections to new
labor unions during the negotiation period for the initial labor contract,
the Williams decision detracts from the RLA's ability to provide
stability in the transportation industry.
It is ironic that Williams became a fundamental case interpreting
the RLA because in Williams the RLA was only a secondary argu-
ment. o The main issue concerned the correct application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), which set a minimum wage for
employees in industries engaged in commerce."'
The facts of Williams are straightforward. Two consolidated
controversies before the Court involved railroad "red caps" 2 and the
companies for which they worked.13 Before enactment of the FLSA,
the red caps worked only for tips. After implementation of the FLSA,
each red cap was guaranteed wages at minimum rates specified in the
act.5" The red caps believed that the FLSA minimum wage guarantee
should have been calculated without an offset for the tips that they
received."
As a practical matter, it is hard to envision a Court sympathetic
to the red caps' FLSA claims. A ruling in favor of the red caps would
have resulted in a financial windfall because the red caps would have
received not only tips, their sole compensation before the FLSA, but
49. 315 U.S. 386 (1942).
50. The Court stated that certiorari was granted "[b]ecause of the importance of the
question whether the tips could be treated as payment of the statutory wage .. " Williams, 315
U.S. at 390.
51. See The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
52. Red caps are comparable to the modem day airline skycaps, who transport luggage for
passengers.
53. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 388.
54. See id. at 390-91.
55. See id. at 390.
1997]
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also would have received the new minimum wage mandated by the
FLSA.
Emotions may have played a part in the red caps' loss on their
FLSA argument. The case was argued one month after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. In the wartime era where necessity and self-
sacrifice were the norm, the red caps' quest for a monetary windfall
might have seemed greedy. The Court dismissed the red caps' FLSA
argument after deciding that the rules of contract, rather than the
FLSA, determine whether tips are included as part of wages. 6
The red caps' secondary RLA argument did not fare much better
and resulted in a RLA precedent that continues to cause unnecessary
labor strife. The red caps claimed that RLA Section 6 status quo
provisions precluded altering the previous payment method while
negotiations were under way. 7 Prior to enactment of the FLSA, tips
were not calculated into any wage computation. Therefore, the red
caps claimed that while RLA negotiations were under way, RLA status
quo restrictions prevented the company from considering tips when
calculating the FLSA minimum wage."
There were two conceptual flaws in the red caps' RLA argument.
First, the RLA status quo provisions maintain only those conditions
existing at the time an RLA Section 6 notice is served. 9 At the time
of the Section 6 notice, the red caps were receiving only tips as wages.
Therefore, even if the red caps were successful with their status quo
argument, the Court's injunction would have been limited to ordering
that the red caps continue to receive only tips as wages. This result is
markedly different from the red caps' actual argument that the status
quo mandated a new method under which FLSA minimum wage
payments were calculated.
The second and most important conceptual flaw was that the
RLA status quo relief sought by the red caps did not promote
Congressional policy. RLA status quo provisions incorporate
injunctive relief remedies. These remedies are designed to promote
negotiations by stabilizing existing conditions.6" In both of the factual
situations discussed in Williams, the unions did not file the lawsuits to
preserve the status quo, but rather to recover monetary damages. In
fact, both unions delayed filing their lawsuits until after negotiations
56. See id. at 407-08 (ruling that the FLSA neither prohibited nor required the inclusion
of tips within wages).
57. See id. at 389-91.
58. See id. at 398.
59. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994)).
60. See Detroit & Toledo Shoreline R.R., 396 U.S. at 148-150.
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were concluded and the initial labor contracts were ratified.61 In this
contractual setting, where the unions were seeking monetary damages,
the policies of the RLA to "facilitate collective bargaining" and "avoid
interruption to carrier operations" could not be directly furthered by
retroactive implementation of the status quo. 62 The Court, therefore,
had no basis in policy on which to predicate support of the unions'
arguments under the RLA.
Unfortunately, however, the Court failed to directly address the
substantive flaws in the red caps' arguments and ruled instead that the
RLA status quo provisions were not available to the unions on
procedural grounds. Central to its rationale, the Court relied on two
words added to the RLA in a 1934 amendment. Specifically, the
Court found decisive the fact that Congress added the words "in
agreements" to the relevant Section 6 status quo language.63 Before
the amendment, status quo protections were implemented after"written notice of an intended change affecting rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions . "..."64 After the 1934 amendment, the RLA
Section 6 language reads as it does today. RLA status quo protections
are implemented after either party gives "notice of an intended change
in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
... 6 (emphasis added).
Because there is no legislative history supporting this small word
change within an otherwise comprehensive amendment, this specific
change was probably meant by Congress as no more than a housekeep-
ing edit. However, the Williams Court construed the rewording as a
major shift in legislative intent. The Court stated that the addition of
the "in agreements" language pointed squarely to limiting the
bargaining provisions of the RLA to existing collective bargaining
agreements. 66
61. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 390-93, 396 ("[A] working agreement ... was signed ... and
the following day this action was commenced.").
62. Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2 (current version at 45 U.S.C. 151a (1994)).
63. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 400; Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6, 44 Stat. at 582 (location
of the status quo provisions prior to 1934 amendment) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 156
(1994)).
64. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6, 44 Stat. at 582 (this notice is the Section 6 notice
described supra in note 36) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994)).
65. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6, 48 Stat. at 1197 (location of the status quo
provisions after the 1934 amendment) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994)).
66. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 399-400. As a further rationale for limiting Section 6 status
quo provisions to collective bargaining agreements, the Court stated: "Arrangements made after
collective bargaining obviously are entitled to a higher degree of permanency and continuity than
those made by the carrier for its own convenience and purpose." Id. at 403.
1997]
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The Court then applied this analysis to the facts in Williams to
procedurally deny both new unions RLA status quo protections. In
the first of the two consolidated cases,67 labor and management had
not negotiated an initial working agreement before the claim arose. In
fact, the employees began working under the new pay rules instituted
by the company before the NMB certified the union. On these facts,
the Court found that the employees had impliedly accepted the new
pay rules in exchange for the consideration of their continued at-will
employment. 6' The Court, therefore, resolved the first situation as a
matter of implied contract law and did not need to reach the red caps'
69RLA argument.
The Court held along similar lines in the second consolidated case
even though the facts were substantially different.7" In this instance,
the NMB certified the union before the employer instituted the new
pay rules. Additionally, the employer ignored union requests to
negotiate the accounting changes.7 The union claimed that the
company violated the good faith bargaining requirements of the RLA.
However, after noting that the union was seeking monetary damages
and that the union and carrier eventually concluded a working
agreement, the Court dismissed the red caps' argument with the
following statement:
Because the carrier was [by RLA Section 2, First] placed under the
duty to exert every effort to make collective agreements, it does not
67. See id. at 391-93.
68. See id. at 398. The Court actually decided the issue under freedom of contract theory,
and the RLA Section 6 status quo discussion may be dicta:
With the effective date of the [FLSA] the employers became bound to pay a minimum
wage to their employees, the red caps. Accordingly the latter were notified that future
earnings from tips must be accounted for and considered as wages. Although
continuously protesting the authority of the railroads to take over the tips, the red caps
remained at work subject to the requirement .... Although the new plan was not
satisfactory to the red caps, the notice transferred to the railroads' credit so much of the
tips as it affected. By continuing to work, a new contract was created.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 394-96.
71. The union sought to declare the agreement invalid under RLA Section 2 up to the time
that the union and employer eventually came to an agreement on the pay terms. See Williams,
315 U.S. at 402. RLA Section 2, First, requires employers "to exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.., in order
to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier .... Railway Labor Act
of 1926, § 2, First (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1994)) (emphasis added). The
timing of the union lawsuit, which arose after the agreement was reached and was only for money
damages, would not have any effect facilitating the purposes of the act since the controversy at
that point was over. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 402.
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follow that, pending those negotiations, where no collective
bargaining agreements are or have been in effect, the carrier cannot
exercise its authority to arrange its business relations with its
employees in the manner shown in this record.72
After Williams, the RLA status quo protections are only
applicable to negotiations modifying existing collective bargaining
agreements. The Williams decision effectively precludes new unions,
which by definition do not yet have an existing working agreement,
from invoking RLA status quo protections while negotiating the initial
labor contract. Where no collective bargaining agreement is in effect
and where no negotiations have taken place, the "freedom of individual
contract" legal theory applies, even where the NMB has certified a
union to represent employees as a recognized group.7 3
B. Soundness of the Williams Reasoning
Given the magnitude of the RLA holding, the Court's justification
was rather thin. The Williams Court's reasoning rested solely on the
literal language of the 1934 RLA amendment, 74 on two cases cited in
a footnote, 71 and on reasoning by analogy to the RLA's good faith
provisions .76
Referencing the 1934 amendment, the Williams Court found it
significant that the legislature amended Section 6 by adding the term
"in agreements.' '77 The Court held the added language signaled that
the legislature altered RLA Section 6 so that only "agreements reached
after collective bargaining are covered.-7 ' The addition of the phrase
"in agreements," however, appears in the amendment without
additional comment that supports a change in legislative intent.79
72. Williams, 315 U.S. at 402.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 400.
75. See id. at 400 n.12.
76. See id. at 402-03.
77. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 400 ("The crucial [Section] 6 is phrased so as to leave no
doubt that only agreements reached after collective bargaining were covered .... [the 1934 RLA
amendment] adding 'in agreements' . . . point[s] squarely to limiting the bargaining provisions
of the Railway Labor Act to collective action.").
78. Williams, 315 U.S. at 400. See also Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6, (current version
at 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1994)) ("[Parties] shall give at least thirty day's written notice of an intended
change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions..."). (emphasis added).
79. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 6, 44 Stat. at 582 (1926); Railway Labor Act of 1926,
amended by Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934).
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The Williams Court also footnoted two cases as analogous to the
consolidated cases before it without commenting on their signifi-
cance.80 These footnoted cases, however, do not lend support to the
Court's holding. The cited cases deal with representation issues whose
subject matter is not covered in RLA Section 6.81 The second of the
two cited cases was not an RLA issue, but rather dealt with a National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) controversy.8 2 Although cases constru-
ing the NLRA may be helpful in construing similar provisions of the
RLA, 3 the NLRA case citation did not support the Williams holding
in this instance because the NLRA does not contain status quo
provisions. 4  An issue of first impression should compel more
extensive analysis than a mere citation to the language of the amend-
ment coupled with footnoting two cases of questionable value.
Finally, the Williams Court presented the following reasoning by
analogy to the RLA's good faith provisions:
The carrier's affirmative duty to exert every effort to make collective
agreements-that is, to bargain in good faith--does not require that
it refrain from exercising "its authority to arrange its business
relations with its employees" where no collective bargaining
agreement is in effect.8 5
But the Williams Court's reasoning missed the intent behind
Congressional RLA policy:
The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 to encourage collective
bargaining by railroads and their employees in order to prevent, if
possible, wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce. The
80. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 400 n.12: ("Cf. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S.
515, 548-49 [(1937)]; National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin [Steel Corp.], 301 U.S.
1, 44-45 [(1937)].").
81. Ironically, if anything, the two cases cited by the Williams Court show that injunctive
relief is proper even when a collective bargaining agreement in not in place between the parties
and no collective bargaining has taken place. See Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 548 (granting an
injunction requiring the railroad to "meet and confer" with a newly certified union based on RLA
Section 2 language, and did not even reach the "in agreements" issue on Section 6); Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 43-44 (The Court decided an NLRA labor representation issue in favor of
the union: "[The] right [of a business] to conduct its business in an orderly manner without
being subjected to arbitrary restraints ... [has no bearing on employee's] correlative right to
organize for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with
employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work.").
82. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22.
83. See Virgin Ad. Airways v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1253 (2nd Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992); cf. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402
U.S. 570, 579 n.l (1971).
84. Status quo provisions are unique to the RLA.
85. Williams, 315 U.S. at 402-03.
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problem of strikes was considered to be particularly acute in the area
of "major disputes," those disputes involving the formation of
collective agreements and efforts to change them (emphasis added).16
An employer's unilateral changes to conditions of employment,
while negotiating an initial collective bargaining agreement, "is as
much a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith as a flat refusal
to negotiate. 8s7  The absence of RLA status quo protections during
bargaining allows a carrier to make unilateral changes under the guise
of a business necessity and is counterproductive to the cooperative
bargaining atmosphere contemplated by Congress when enacting the
RLA.
C. Same Court, Different Day
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union88 was
a notable movement away from Williams' strict "in agreements"
holding. In Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. (Detroit & Toledo), a
railroad company attempted to establish a work reporting site far away
from its normal operating location. Previously, employees reported to
one central location and then were transported, at company expense
and on company time, to the outlying locations.8 9 The proposed
change saved the company operating costs but placed a financial
burden on affected employees. This particular matter had never come
up before and, therefore, was not addressed in the existing collective
bargaining agreement. 90
The company claimed it was free to make the change in work
assignments without going through the RLA dispute resolution
process. Since the matter was not part of any previous written
agreement, the company claimed the proposed work rule did not
qualify as a change "in agreements" that invoked RLA Section 6 status
quo provisions. 9' The union countered that the day-to-day practices
and expectations of the employees were as much a part of the collective
bargaining agreement as the written agreement terms.92
In contrast to the .Williams decision, the Court in Detroit &
Toledo held that the term "in agreements" contained in Section 6 of the
86. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 148 (emphasis added).
87. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Transportes Aereos Mercantiles, 924 F.2d 1005,
1010 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing NLRB v. Kratz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)).
88. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
89. See id. at 142.
90. See id. at 143-44.
91. See id. at 147-48.
92. See id. at 146-48.
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
RLA was to be broadly construed. 93 "Agreements" reached between
companies and unions are not only those written into collective
bargaining agreements but also those common every day practices that
both the union and company recognize as normal during the ordinary
course of business. 4 It is ironic that the Detroit & Toledo Court used
the "freedom of individual contract" logic found in Williams to show
that the RLA status quo provisions applied "without any limitation to
those obligations already embodied in collective agreements." 95
Detroit & Toledo is important not only for broadening the scope
of the phrase "in agreements," but also for the uncertainty it cast over
the continued validity of the Williams decision. The Detroit & Toledo
Court distinguished the Williams decision by stating the following:
In Williams there was absolutely no prior history of any collective
bargaining or agreement between the parties on any matter.
Without pausing to comment upon the present vitality of either of
these grounds ... it is readily apparent that Williams involved only
the question of whether the status quo requirement of [Section] 6
applied at all.96
However, the Detroit & Toledo Court stopped short of overruling
Williams because of factual differences. Significantly, in Detroit &
Toledo, the union members had an initial working agreement in
place. 97 Because of this fact, lower courts must adhere to the Wil-
liams holding even when the consequences for new unions are harsh.
93. See id. at 153.
94. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 153-54 ("The status quo provisions
of §§ 5, 6, or 10. .extends [sic] to those actual, objective working conditions out of which the
dispute arose, and clearly these conditions need not be covered in an existing agreement.").
95. Id. at 148. See also id. at 153-54. The situation would have worked equally in the
railroad's favor had there been a past practice of reporting to work in outlying locations for a
sufficient period of time, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employees. In this instance,
the condition would have become a part of the actual working conditions even if it was not written
into the collective bargaining agreement.
96. Id. at 158.
97. See id. at 158. In addition, in a 5-4 decision, the Court may have limited the Detroit
& Toledo status quo requirement to obligations arising under existing written agreements and
implied agreements from an "unquestioned practice for many years." Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
R.R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 506 (1989). However, the Fourth
Circuit specifically reversed a district court reaching this conclusion and held that Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R. is not to be read expansively and only holds that "a union may not interfere with
a railroad's decision to sell its assets ... [by invoking the status quo] where the collective
bargaining agreement is silent as to such a sale." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v.
Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 1992).
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D. Dealing With the Aftermath of Williams
The Second, D.C., and Ninth Circuit courts recently decided
RLA issues in line with the Williams reasoning.9" All three cases
involved circumstances where an employer made unilateral changes in
working conditions after union certification, but before negotiations
began on an initial collective bargaining agreement. In Virgin Atlantic
Airways, the airline company unilaterally altered rates of pay and did
not bargain with the union.99 In Trans World Airlines, Inc., the
airline company refused to meet with the newly certified union and
made unilateral changes in working conditions by altering flight
attendant duties.1"' Lastly, in Regional Airline Pilots Ass'n, the airline
company withdrew flight pass privileges sixteen days after union
certification, without bargaining. 101
The circuit courts each recognized that the policy behind Williams
had been somewhat eroded by the holding in Detroit & Toledo, but
concluded that Williams still controlled." 2 Summarizing the posi-
tions of the other courts, the Second Circuit intimated that these results
must follow from the Williams decision:
[A]s the D.C. Circuit stated when faced with a similar problem, the
[Detroit & Toledo] decision "plainly stops short of overruling
Williams and leaves it binding in a case like the one before us where
there has been 'absolutely no prior history of any collective
bargaining or agreement between the parties on any matter.' '103
The most recent case of a union directly challenging the Williams
rationale is Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines,
Inc. (Atlantic Coast)."° The Atlantic Coast holding demonstrates that
the Williams decision continues to detract from the purposes and policy
of the RLA.
98. See Virgin Ad. Airways v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245 (2nd Cir. 1992);
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d
809 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988); Regional Airlines Pilots Ass'n. v. Wings West
Airlines; Inc., 915 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991).
99. See Virgin Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1252-53.
100. See Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d at 812.
101. See Regional Airline Pilots Ass'n, 915 F.2d at 1400.
102. See Virgin At. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1253; Trans World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d at 814.
103. Virgin Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1253 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d
at 814).
104. 55 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 1995).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Atlantic Coast: Statement of The Facts"0 5
The NMB certified the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association
(AMFA) as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for
employees of Atlantic Coast Airlines (ACA) on March 11, 1994.
Active collective bargaining began in March 1994, and shortly
thereafter the NMB appointed a federal mediator at AMFA's
request.10 6
In April 1994, ACA attempted, unilaterally, to change working
conditions by tightening overtime pay criteria. ACA rescinded the
unilateral change after receiving a warning from AMFA's legal
counsel.107
In October 1994, ACA re-implemented the unilateral change to
overtime wage calculation. At the same time, ACA announced that it
was eliminating the union job classification of lead mechanic and
assigning its job functions to a new managerial job classification. ACA
also unilaterally implemented changes in sick leave policy.'08
As a result of ACA's unilateral changes, AMFA's members
suffered loss of wages, compulsory demotions, lost work opportunities,
and increased pressure to perform their sensitive safety functions while
physically ill. None of these changes were negotiated, and all of the
changes were implemented after the union was certified to represent
the employees and collective bargaining had begun."
ACA's unilateral actions have irreparably harmed AMFA and its
members, as well as the traveling public. The harm to AMFA and its
members is due to ACA's unrestrained ability to implement changes
in working conditions. ACA's actions essentially undermine AMFA's
bargaining leverage during the entire resolution process mandated by
the RLA; particularly, in regard to major disputes. Since ACA knows
it can achieve these changes without AMFA's agreement, there is little
incentive to negotiate.
ACA's unrestrained, unilateral actions have also irreparably
harmed the traveling public by increasing the likelihood of a work
105. Reproduced from Appellant's Opening Brief at 3-4, Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., 55
F.3d at 90 (No. 94-9230) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review) (hereinafter Appellant's
Brief).
106. See Appellant's Brief at 3.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 3-4.
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stoppage. Since both AMFA and the NMB were denied the ability to
exert pressure on ACA to negotiate by forestalling ACA's unilateral
action, the only means now left to AMFA to exert pressure during
negotiations is a work stoppage.
B. Decision of U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
The Atlantic Coast court denied the union's argument that RLA
status quo injunctive relief should be granted through the completion
of RLA proceedings."' In reaching its decision, the court held that
Williams remained good law and controlled the outcome of the case:
"A newly certified union that has no collective bargaining agreement
with the carrier is not entitled to a status quo freeze under the
Act." '' The court then denied the union's claim after noting that
no collective bargaining agreement had been previously formed
between the parties." 2
C. Subsequent History
Finally, the union, having no other legal remedy, sought a
declaratory judgment that it was not prohibited by the RLA from
striking." 3  In a bitter irony, the district court denied the union's
motion as violating the RLA Section 2 duty to bargain in goodfaith. 14
The district court elected not to extend the rationale of a previous
Second Circuit decision."' In United Airlines, Inc. (United), the
Second Circuit held that a newly certified union, with no agreement in
place, was entitled to strike where the union repeatedly made overtures
to the carrier to bargain and the carrier refused." 6 The analogy for
AMFA was that making unilateral changes was as much evidence of
an unwillingness to bargain as an outright refusal to bargain.
Apparently in the Second Circuit, however, as long as the employer
goes through the motions of bargaining, the employer is allowed to
make unilateral changes in working conditions, and the union is not
allowed to respond by a work stoppage or any other self-help measures.
110. See Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d at 93.
111. Id. at 94.
112. See id. at 93.
113. See Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Org. v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., No. 94-CV
7915 (JSM), 1995 WL 753902, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1995).
114. See id.
115. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Div., Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 874 F.2d 110
(2nd Cir. 1989).
116. See id. at 112.
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The anomaly of the situation is appalling. One party's ability to
take unrestrained unilateral action during the collective bargaining
process is a complete evisceration of the Act's primary mechanism for
peacefully resolving labor disputes. So long as ACA continues to enjoy
an unrestrained ability to unilaterally implement changes in working
conditions, it has no incentive to cooperate with either AMFA or the
NMB.
The district court decision is currently on appeal with the Second
Circuit."7
D. Creative Arguments Necessitated By Williams'
Harsh Consequences
Labor unions have resorted to creative arguments in an attempt
to circumvent the harsh effects of the Williams ruling, and have met
with some success. The Eleventh Circuit granted a union's prayer for
status quo injunctive relief based on RLA Section 2, a general section
requiring parties to conduct their activities in good faith."' The
court combined the rationale of Shore Line with National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) precedent to conclude that making unilateral
changes during negotiations was, in itself, evidence of bad faith
negotiating, and therefore precluded by RLA Section 2.1 The court
held that injunctive relief to prevent unilateral changes in working
117. See generally Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Org. v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, No. 94-CV
7915 (JSM), 1996 WL 169365 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1996).
118. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Transportes Aereos Mercantiles, 924 F.2d
1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1991). The lth Circuit framed the issue as the follows: "[W]hether
[Section) 2, First's duty to bargain in good faith, standing alone, precludes unilateral changes after
negotiations have commenced." Id.
119. The Eleventh Circuit Court's combined analysis of Detroit & Toledo, Chicago & N. W.
Ry. v. United Transp. Union (Chicago), and NLRB v. Kratz precedent is summarized as follows:
1) The policy behind Detroit & Toledo, applicable even where a collective bargaining
agreement is not in place, is that "if management is permitted to make unilateral
changes in working conditions during collective bargaining, the union's position will be
undermined, interruptions to interstate commerce are likely to occur, and the purposes
of the Act will be frustrated.";
2) An analogy to NLRB v. Kratz for the proposition that under the NLRA, "that 'an
employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment while under negotiation for
an initial collective bargaining agreement is as much a violation of the duty to bargain
in good faith as a flat refusal to negotiate.';
3) An analogy to the NLRA was appropriate in this instance because the Chicago Court
held that both the RLA and the NLRA require the same good faith bargaining; and
4) RLA "§ 2, First provides legally enforceable duties" which prevent frustration of the
Act in the above manner.
Id. at 1009-10.
[Vol. 21:189
1997] Labor Strife 209
conditions was proper even though the negotiation process on an initial
collective bargaining agreement was not fully completed. 120
On the other hand, an attempt to circumvent Williams using
union election and certification protection was unsuccessfully tried in
Automotive, Petroleum and Allied Industries Employees Union, Local 618
v. Trans States Airlines.121  The defendant airline suspended annual
merit raises for flight attendants following union certification, but
before the initial collective bargaining agreement was reached. Rather
than challenge the Williams holding, the union argued that the post
certification change in policy was motivated by anti-union animus in
violation of union election and certification laws.'22  The court
refused to enjoin the company's conduct after noting that anti-union
animus does not appear to be relevant to the legal analysis in Williams
and that election and certification protection for unions is primarily
limited to pre-certification conduct.'23
120. See TransportesAereos Mercantiles, 924 F.2d at 1010-11. The 11th Circuit reached its
conclusion by the following process:
1) Acknowledging that courts should hesitate to provide injunctive relief "unless that
remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right.";
2) Stating that injunctive necessity did not mean that an injunction could not issue until
all negotiations were completed, because the negotiations were the very procedures being
undermined.;
3) Interpreting the Chicago holding as not limiting injunctive relief to completed
negotiations. The court made the observation that, in Chicago, the fact that negotiations
were completed was incidental to the Chicago Court's holding that during those
negotiations, the RLA Section 2 duty to bargain in good faith was not complied with;
4) Stating the policies underlying the RLA were "designed to preserve the status quo
and to discourage resort to self-help during the time that the RLA procedures are being
pursued.";
5) Specifically finding that the necessity test for injunctive relief was met where
"unilateral changes... will inevitably undermine [the union's] bargaining position,....
could only serve to undermine the union members' confidence in [the union], and to
undermine the ability of [the union] to bargain on a fair and equal basis with
management."
Id.. at 1010-11 and 1011 n.9.
Although not specifically addressed in Transportes Aereos Mercantiles, there is support for an
expansive reading of the judiciary's injunctive relief authority in Chicago. The Chicago Court
found the legislative history indicated that the RLA was intentionally written in general language
rather than specific language to allow "'enforcement of the duties and obligations [to] develop
through the courts in the way in which the common law has developed."' Chicago & N. W. Ry.,
402 U.S. at 577 (citing Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180) Before the House Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong. 91 (1926)).
121. 926 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
122. See id. at 872.
123. See id. at 872. The court ruled that post-certification protections under RLA Section
152, Fourth, are limited only to prevent behavior which strikes "a fundamental blow to union or
employer activity and the collective bargaining process itself." Id. at 873 (quoting Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989)).
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Unless the policies behind the Williams decision are revisited,
labor unions will only occasionally succeed in employing creative
arguments, one of their only remaining ways to attempt to restore the
balance destroyed by Williams. If Williams is allowed to stand,
employers may continue to take disruptive unilateral actions affecting
negotiations on the initial working agreement.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
First, Williams should be overruled, or limited by recognizing the
contractual setting under which it was decided. The Court's argument
is logically sound in a contractual remedy context but is distinguishable
conceptually from the injunctive nature of RLA status quo relief. The
argument within the Williams case reflects the Court's contractual
mind set: "Arrangements made after collective bargaining obviously
are entitled to a higher degree of permanency and continuity than those
made by the carrier for its own convenience and purpose. 124
In a contractual remedy context, where parties are at odds over
money damages, written agreements certainly deserve a higher degree
of permanency and continuity. Conceptually, however, if the policy of
the RLA is to promote labor peace by maintaining the status quo
during negotiations, it should not make any difference whether
common understandings regarding work rules are formally embodied
in a written agreement or not. A formal or informal agreement found
between the parties can be used equally effectively to establish the
status quo and promote the RLA objectives of labor peace. This was
exactly the setting behind the Detroit & Toledo holding and largely the
factual setting in Atlantic Coast.
Williams' continued application should be limited only to
situations where unions, which have neither a collective bargaining
agreement nor have begun any negotiations, seek retroactive compensa-
tory payments for alleged status quo violations.
Second, RLA Section 6 status quo provisions should apply in
factual situations, similar to Atlantic Coast, where newly formed unions
seek RLA status quo protections during bargaining. Detroit &
Toledo's mandate to broadly construe RLA Section 6's "in agreements"
language should be construed to infer an implied contract on the first
day of union certification. In Detroit & Toledo, a pre-existing
collective bargaining agreement served as a stepping stone for an
injunction defining the status quo more broadly than the written
124. Williams, 315 U.S. at 403.
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agreement.'25 In Atlantic Coast, the status quo could have been
defined by the "actual, objective, working conditions" that were part
of the ordinary course of business at the time the union was certi-
fied. 126
By analogy, the Third Circuit did not require an existing written"agreement" for purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of an Adjustment
Board in a minor RLA dispute. The court reasoned that:
[A] union [sic] and employer's adoption of a labor contract is not
dependent on the reduction to writing of their intention to be
bound. Instead, what is required is conduct manifesting an
intention to abide by the terms of an agreement. 127
In a similar fashion, the Williams Court did not have trouble
finding an implied contract between the employer and unrepresented
employees when the employees continued to work after the employer
had imposed a new accounting program. Therefore, it should not
offend the Williams implied contract rationale to infer an implied
contractual "agreement" when the employer continues to offer
employment after union certification but before the initial collective
bargaining agreement is formed. This implied contract, made up of
the Detroit & Toledo "objective working conditions," would establish
the status quo during subsequent negotiations on the initial collective
bargaining agreement.
Finally, allowing new unions status quo protections during
bargaining on their initial contract promotes the purposes of the RLA.
By establishing an atmosphere of labor and management peace during
the running of the status quo, negotiations are facilitated and an initial
collective bargaining agreement can be reached without unwanted
interruptions to transportation. This is a solution which ultimately
benefits labor, management, and our national economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, violent labor conflicts were especially notable in the
railroad industry during the late nineteenth century and continuing
through the beginning of the twentieth century. Because of the
transportation industry's importance to national security, Congress was
receptive toward a unique approach to resolving the long standing
125. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R., 396 U.S. at 143.
126. See id. at 153-54.
127. McQuestion v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 30 F.3d 388, 393 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(quoting NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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labor conflicts. Key to the success of the new approach was a dispute
resolution mechanism with provisions that promoted stability.
Specifically, these provisions stipulated that collective bargaining
agreements never expire, but are only amended as the need arises, and
that the status quo be maintained for an almost unlimited amount of
time during subsequent contract negotiations.
The RLA's status quo requirement is central to its design. Since
disputes usually arise when one party wants to change the status quo
without undue delay, the power that the RLA gives the other party to
preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will frequently make it
worthwhile for the moving party to compromise. This compromise
allows the interests of both sides to be taken into account, and thus
facilitates agreements without interruption to commerce.
Unfortunately, the holding in Williams frustrates the process of
peaceful dispute resolution. In Williams, the Court ruled that the
RLA's dispute resolution provisions are only applicable after a union
and an employer have negotiated an initial working agreement. The
Williams Court held that where no previous working agreement exists,
an employer was not bound under the RLA status quo provisions.
Although Williams has never been overruled, the Court's subsequent
holding in Detroit & Toledo criticized the Williams principle and called
for a more expansive application of the RLA dispute resolution
provisions.
Atlantic Coast demonstrates the harshness of the Williams
decision. As a result of the employer's unilateral changes, the
employee union's members suffered loss of wages, compulsory
demotions, lost work opportunities, and increased pressure to perform
sensitive safety functions while physically ill. The employer's
unrestrained ability to implement changes in working conditions
undermined the union's bargaining leverage during the entire dispute
resolution process mandated by the RLA. Since ACA knows it can
achieve these changes without the union's agreement, there is little
incentive to negotiate.
Detroit & Toledo and Atlantic Coast implicate the identical RLA
policy: "[I]f management is permitted to make unilateral changes in
working conditions during collective bargaining, the union's position
will be undermined, interruptions to interstate commerce are likely to
occur, and the purposes of the Act will be frustrated."' 28
In order for RLA status quo provisions to have the meaning and
effect intended by Congress, parties must have the equal ability to
128. Transportes Aereos Mercantiles, 924 F.2d at 1008.
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invoke them. The recent labor strife at American Airlines demon-
strates the power of the status quo provisions. A comparison of recent
and previous labor conflicts at American demonstrates that the status
quo provisions can be beneficial to management's interests as well as
to labor's interests. By diverting the parties from counterproductive
activities, the status quo provisions foster an atmosphere where
productive negotiations may occur. The avoidance of labor strife and
the facilitation of an atmosphere of cooperative bargaining are precisely
the reasons Congress implemented the status quo provisions of the
RLA.
By declining to recognize that Congressional RLA policy is broad
enough to protect new labor unions, the Williams ruling frustrates the
Congressional intent behind the RLA and continues to cause unneces-
sary labor strife. Detroit & Toledo opened the door for federal courts
to move away from the Williams contractual rationale and reshape the
law in accordance with the policies of the RLA. It is time for the
Supreme Court to revisit Williams.
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